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12.1  Introduction 
One hears increasingly of  a yen bloc forming in East Asia, of a switch on 
the part of the countries in this region in economic allegiance from the United 
States to Japan. This bloc is said to be forming in parallel with, and perhaps in 
response to, the formation of blocs in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. 
In the case of Europe, the policy elements of a likely bloc are self-evident. 
The European Community agreed in the 1980s  to strengthen its economic inte- 
gration, most notably with the Single Market Act of 1985 and the other initia- 
tives associated with the year  1992. Leading the way  have been attempts to 
stabilize the values of  the European currencies vis-A-vis each other-begin- 
ning with the Snake of  the 1970s and followed by  the more successful Euro- 
pean Monetary System founded in 1979-and  the more ambitious plans for 
European Monetary Union agreed upon at Maastricht in December 1991. In 
the case of  the Western Hemisphere, the policy elements are almost as self- 
evident. On  the trade front they consist most notably of  the Canadian-U.S. 
Free Trade Area, followed by  the addition of  Mexico to a North American 
Free Trade Area currently under negotiation and future plans for other Latin 
American countries to join in. Integration on the currency front is not as strong 
a trend in the Western Hemisphere as in Europe. But most Latin American 
countries remained pegged to the dollar in the mid-1970s (following it in the 
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devaluations of  1971 and 1973, for example). Fifteen years later, having first 
lost their monetary virginity and then having fought their way back most of the 
way to price stability, a few Latin American countries are considering whether 
to repeg their currencies to the dollar.’ Argentina has already done so. 
In East Asia, explicit policy initiatives are missing. The phrase “yen bloc” 
connotes to some a concentration of  trade and drect investment relations on 
the part of East Asian countries, to others a heightened role in the region for 
the Japanese currency. These two possible interpretations of “yen bloc” are 
not necessarily in competition, because one could be  a contributing cause of 
the other. 
Not  only have  currency links and bilateral trade links been less often the 
subject of  policy initiatives in East Asia than in other regions, but they have 
also been less extensively studied. We  consider in this paper three possible 
components of a yen bloc hypothesis: (1) The role of the yen is increasing over 
time in the exchange rate policies of  the East Asian economies. Actions are 
taken by the countries in the region to stabilize bilateral exchange rates vis-2- 
vis Japan (and thereby vis-a-vis each other). (2) A regional trading bloc cen- 
tered on Japan is emerging. Trade between Japan and other East Asian econo- 
mies has been increasing more rapidly than  what would be predicted based on 
such factors as bilateral GNPs and transportation costs. (3) Stabilization of 
exchange rates vis-h-vis the yen, item 1 above, is one of  the causes of increased 
intraregional trade, item 2.2 
This paper examines relevant statistics on all three aspects of a de facto yen 
bloc. Even if these hypotheses clearly held, there would still be a fourth ques- 
tion to consider: To what extent is the increased role of the yen orchestrated by 
the Japanese government, or deliberately enhanced by  other governments in 
the region? Throughout, we  will concurrently investigate an alternative hy- 
pothesis, that East Asia remains part of a U.S. dollar bloc. Our conclusions, to 
anticipate, are that the yen  bloc hypothesis and its constituent propositions 
stated above do not hold up as empirical characterizations of the 1980s. Rather, 
East Asia remains more closely affiliated with the dollar bloc. 
12.2  The Yen versus the Dollar in East Asia 
The theory of optimum currency areas suggests that relatively small trade- 
oriented countries might want to stabilize the foreign exchange value of their 
currencies. In the case of  the East Asian countries, though they tend to be 
trade-oriented, it is not clear which major foreign currency should be the one 
to link to. 
1. Dornbusch (1992) has suggested that Mexico might repeg its peso. Mancera (1991), however, 
2. This paper thus extends the results on bilateral trade in Frankel (1992a) by  focusing on the 
thinks this unlikely. 
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12.2.1  Weights in the Exchange Rate Baskets of East Asian Currencies 
We begin by examining the relative importance of the Japanese yen and U.S. 
dollar in  the exchange rate policies of nine East Asian developing countries. 
We  will argue that in the sphere of exchange rate policies, the evidence of an 
increasing role of the yen is relatively faint, and the U.S. dollar continues to 
dwarf all other currencies. 
Only a few Asian currencies are pegged to the dollar, and none is to the 
yen.3 Many are officially or de facto linked to a basket of  major currencies. 
Typically, the weights assigned to various currencies are not announced, but 
the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen are clearly on the list of  candidates. One 
possible piece of evidence for the formation of a yen bloc in East Asia would 
be an increasing weight assigned to the yen in these countries’ baskets. Since 
the weights are generally secret, it is particularly important to infer policies by 
observing actual behavior, rather than relying on official pronouncements.4 We 
estimate the implicit weights econometrically. 
We  use weekly data (Friday close of  the London market, from Data Re- 
source Inc.) from the beginning of  1979 to the second week of May of  1992. 
The test is a regression of the changes in the value of the domestic currency 
against the changes in the values of foreign currencies. 
In the case of a perfect basket peg, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
will uncover the correct weights regardless of the choice of numeraire used to 
measure “the values” of  currencies (assuming only that the list of currencies 
used to try to explain the exchange rate includes all relevant candidates). When 
the currency is not perfectly pegged to any basket, the choice of  numeraire 
affects the interpretation of the error term. Frankel (1992a) chooses the inverse 
of domestic CPI as the numeraire, so as to interpret changes in the values of 
currencies as the changes in the purchasing power of the currency in question. 
The CPI data are only available on a monthly basis. We choose here to express 
the values of all currencies in terms of the Swiss franc. We  use the bilateral 
exchange rate data in our regressions because we want to take advantage of 
weekly data. (We have tried the same tests using the special drawing right 
[SDR] as the numeraire, for several of the countries, including Korea, and find 
very similar results. These results are not reported here.) 
3. Reisen and Trotsenburg (1988) discuss the pros and cons of  the Four Dragons pegging to the 
yen. Park and Park (1991) emphasize the problems that fluctuations in the yeddollar rate create 
for these four countries. Kwan (1992) argues that the Four, who compete with Japan in third 
markets, are relatively better candidates to peg to the yen, while the ASEAN countries, who import 
manufactures from Japan and export commodities, are relatively worse candidates to peg to the 
yen. 
4.  Indeed, many countries that claim to follow a basket peg do not in fact do so. For a possible 
explanation of why countries keep the weights secret, see Lowell (1992) and Takagi (1988). The 
basic idea is that secret weights allow the governments to devalue their currencies secretly when 
they so desire. But secret weights undermine the governments’ ability to commit credibly to a 
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Two kinds of regressions are reported here for each currency and each sam- 
ple period. The first one uses the US.  dollar and Japanese yen  as the only 
regressors (plus a constant to pick up any trend appreciation or depreciation). 
The second also includes the deutschemark (DM), Australian dollar, and New 
Zealand dollar in the list. Other European currencies are not used, in part be- 
cause they are highly correlated with the movement of the DM. 
The main  findings are as follows:  (1) All  nine  currencies assign heavy 
weight to the U.S. dollar during each two-year period in the sample. (2) Only 
one East Asian currency, the Singapore dollar, has throughout the period as- 
signed weight to the yen in addition to the dollar. (3) Several currencies gave 
a bit of increased weight to the yen during the period 1981-84, when the dollar 
was strongly appreciating (the Singapore dollar), in 1985-86,  as the dollar hit 
its peak and began to depreciate (the Hong Kong dollar, Indonesian rupiah, 
Thai baht), or in 1987-88,  after the dollar had completed most of its deprecia- 
tion (the New Taiwan [NT] dollar). (4) The only currencies to place a signifi- 
cant weight on the yen in the most recent subperiod (1991-92),  besides the 
Singapore dollar, are the Malaysian ringgit and the Thai baht. 
In summary, the observed role of the yen in the mid-1980s is likely to have 
been the result of  a temporary overvaluation of the U.S. dollar. As far as ex- 
change rate policies are concerned, a more permanent role for the yen is yet to 
be seen. 
We  now turn to details of exchange rate targeting for individual currencies. 
Detailed regression results are reported in tables 12.1-12.9. 
Korean Won 
The Korean won has been linked more or less solely to the U.S. dollar ac- 
cording to these estimates. The average weight assigned to the dollar in the 
entire 1979-92  sample is about 0.96. 
In the 1979-80 period, the won had an implicit weight of 0.93 on the dollar. 
The dollar weight was even higher in the 1981-88  period, even though Korea 
supposedly abandoned its official dollar peg in January 1980 in favor of a bas- 
ket. No positive weight is found assigned to the Japanese yen in these estimates 
(except for some faint signs in the 1981-82  and 1987-88  periods), nor to the 
DM or other currencies. Throughout the sample, the won  systematically and 
statistically  significantly depreciated  against  the  numeraire  currency  (the 
Swiss franc) for every two-year period, except for the brief period of 1987-88, 
when the won appreciated. 
In the most recent subperiods, 1989-90  and from 1991 to the second week 
of May of  1992, the weight on the dollar is statistically not different from one 
(and the adjusted R2 is about 0.98 in both periods). This finding is particularly 
interesting in light of the “market average rate” (MAR) system of setting the 
exchange rate of the won adopted by the Korean authorities. The MAR system 
was instituted in March 1990, in response to American political pressure, and 
supposedly allows a greater role for the market in determining the won/dollar 299  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 12.1  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Korean Won  (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  R2/D-W  Chowmite 
1979-80  -.O03Ow  .93** 
,0017  .14 
-.0030  .87* 
.0018  .35 
,0004  .02 
-.0012**  1.03** 
,0004  .07 
1983-84  -.OOO8*  .94** 
,0003  .03 
-.0008*  .93** 
,0003  .03 
1985-86  -.0007**  .94** 
.0002  .01 
-.0007**  .95** 
,0002  .02 
1987-88  .0021**  .94** 
,0002  .02 
.0020**  .go** 
,0002  .02 
1989-90  -.OW*  1.00** 
.ooo2  .02 
-.0005*  1.01** 
.0002  .02 
,0004  .03 
-.0009*  .98** 
.0004  .05 
.OOO3  .02 
-.0007*  .95** 
,0003  .03 
1981-82  -.0012**  .98** 
1991-92  -.0010**  1.03** 
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.01  .00  .00 
.06  .02  .02 
-.01  -.00  -.01 
.04  .01  .01 
.04  .05**  -.01 
.07  .02  .01 
.03  -.01  -.01 
.04  .02  .02 
-.09”  -.Ol  .07# 
.06  .03  .05 
-.oo  .01  .01 
.05  .02  .02 
,3112.03  ,7911.52 
,3012.02  .74/6.18 
,9612.24  .49/3.00 
,9612.19  1.2 116.33 
.94/2.34  1.5411.03 
.93/2.35  .75/12.06 
,9911.45  11.51**/7.24 
,9911.45  5.72**/18.12 
,981.97  8.2117.25 
,981.93  3.36**/14.96 
,9811.38  3.7012.81 
,9811.39  2.30*116.67 
,9812.26  1.5516.43 
,9812.24  34130.43 
,8211.94  4.65**/1.76 
3211.94  2.29*14.02 
Notes: “R2” refers to “R2  adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
XStatistically  significant at the 90 percent level. 
“Statistically  significant at the 85 percent level. 
rate.5 But the absence of any fall in the R2 or dollar coefficient in these esti- 
mates suggests that the won is as closely pegged to the dollar as it ever was. 
We  consider the case of  the won  in detail in  the last section of  this paper, 
5. Monthly estimates of the determination of the won in Frankel (1992b) assign a significant 
weight to the yen during the period April  1988-March  1990 when currency values are measured 
in terms of purchasing power, but not when they are measured in terms of the SDR. 300  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 12.2  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Singapore Dollar (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
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Notes: "R2"  refers to "R2  adjusted for degrees of freedom." Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of  units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
#Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
"Statistically  significant at the 85 percent level. 
in light of the special role played by  Korea's  political relationship with the 
United States. 
Singapore Dollar 
The Singapore dollar is the only currency among the nine examined here 
that assigns weights to both the yen and dollar during the entire sample pe- 
riod (1979-92). 301  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Singapore dollar moved with a basket of 
at least  five  currencies: U.S.  dollar, yen, DM, Australian dollar, and New 
Zealand  dollar, with  estimated weights  of  .19, .05, .21, .45,  and  .20.6 The 
weight on the yen was among the lowest, a mere 5 percent, and only marginally 
significant at the 85 percent level. The Australian dollar had the highest appar- 
ent weight (45 percent), but it may  be picking up  some of  the weight that 
should properly be assigned to the U.S. dollar. 
In the early 1980s, the weight on the yen doubled, the weight on the dollar 
fell slightly, and the weights on other currencies fell sharply. For example, 
during the 1983-84  period the weights on the U.S. dollar and yen are statisti- 
cally significant (0.73 and 0.18, respectively), while weights on all the other 
currencies are statistically not different from zero (these are similar to the re- 
sults in Frankel [1992a]). 
Relative to the numeraire currency, the Singapore dollar depreciated by 
about 0.15 percent during 1985-86,  after controlling for the movement of the 
U.S. dollar and other currencies relative to the numeraire. But the Singapore 
dollar appreciated during the subsequent 1987-90  period to more than offset 
the earlier depreciation. 
Hong Kong Dollar 
The Hong Kong dollar gives very heavy weight to the U.S.  dollar. In the 
early 1980s the peg was nevertheless somewhat loose. During the period 1987- 
92, the U.S. dollar peg is close to perfect: a coefficient and R2  virtually equal 
to 1 .O  and a constant term of zero. The only subperiod when significant weight 
is granted the yen is 1985-86, when Hong Kong appeared to experiment with 
a peg to a basket of the two major currencies, presumably to avoid overvalu- 
ation from pegging solely to the U.S. dollar during a period when the Ameri- 
can currency was very strong. 
New Taiwan Dollar 
The NT dollar was apparently rigidly pegged to the U.S. dollar with very 
narrow margin before 1981. The point estimate of  the dollar weight during 
1979-80  was one, and the R2 was 1.0. The fluctuation margin widened after 
1981. The dollar weight was not statistically different from one during the 
1983-84  and 1985-86  periods (and R2s were above .97), though the value of 
the NT dollar could deviate somewhat more from that of the U.S. dollar at any 
given point in time. Prior to 1986, the US.  dollar was clearly the only currency 
to which the NT dollar was pegged. 
During 1987-88,  the yen  did receive significant weight (an estimated  13 
percent). why did the yen weight suddenly rise? Since 1986 the U.S. Treasury 
had been applying pressure to Taiwan and the other newly industrialized coun- 
tries (NICs) to allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar; the Amer- 
6.  The weights do not necessarily add up to one because no such constraint is imposed in the re- 
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Table 12.3  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Hong Kong Dollar (January 1,1979-May  8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  R2/D-W  Chowmite 
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Notes; “RZ”  refers to “R2  adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
“Statistically  significant at the 85 percent level. 
ican government was disappointed that its trade balance had not yet responded 
to the 1985-86  Plaza-induced depreciation of  the dollar against the yen and 
European currencies and thought that part of the explanation might lie in the 
choice of the NICs and other countries to follow the dollar down. Taiwan, with 
a visible stockpiling of international reserves that was close to a world record, 
was a particular target. The Taiwanese apparently responded to the pressure to 303  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 12.4  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Taiwan Dollar (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen 
.woo  1.00**  .M) 
.oooo  .00  .00 
.oooo  1.00**  .00 
.moo  .00  .00 
-.OW8  .94**  .04 
.OOO8  .05  .07 
-.OOO4  .74** -.03 
.0008  .I5  .09 
.0000  1.01**  -.01 
,0002  .02  .04 
.0000  1.01**  -.01 
,0002  .02  .04 
.0009**  .99**  .01 
,0003  .02  .02 
.OOO9**  .99**  .02 
.0003  .02  .03 
.0020**  .94**  .13* 
,0004  .03  .06 
.0020**  .97**  .13* 
,0004  .04  .06 
.OOO6  .99**  .09 
.0011  .08  .08 
,0006  .83**  .05 
,0011  .12  .08 
.0011*  .94**  .08 
.OOO5  .04  .07 
.0009#  .94**  .lo” 
,0005  .07  .06 
.OOO5*  .96**  .05* 
,0002  .02  .02 
.0005*  .94**  .04* 
,0002  .02  .02 
DM  Aus$  NZ$  R’ID-W  ChowIWhite 






















.01  .82/1.93 
.05 
,9711.62  1 SY3.19 
.02 
.04 
-  .00 
.02 


















.01  ,921.86 
.03 
,6512.4  1 
5.06**/20.12 
3.15*17.04 




.I8  ,6512.45 
.I3 
.94/1.93  .63/3.19 
.15# 
.09 
-  .09* 
.05 









.01  ,8812.07 
.01 
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Nores: “Rz”  refers to “Rz adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of  units of  Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99  percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95  percent level. 
“Statistically significant at the 90  percent level. 
T3atistically significant at the 85 percent level. 
appreciate their currency by putting some weight in their basket on the appreci- 
ating yen, as well as by appreciating steadily against the basket overall. 
Malaysian Ringgit 
At  the beginning of  the  1980s, Malaysia had a diversified basket for the 
ringgit. The yen was clearly included in this basket during 1981-82. The large 
weight on the dollar fluctuates during the eighties, between .64 and .90. The 304  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 12.5  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Malaysian Ringgit (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  RZID-W  ChowlWhite 
1979-80  ,0001  .87**  .07”  3012.02  .38/2.95 
,0006  .05  .os 
,0001  .ll  .02  .23*  .64**  .18*  .8812.00  3.90**/57.07** 
.OOO5  .09  .04  .10  .ll  .08 
,0005  .03  .04 
,0005  .09  .05  .07  .14  .03 
,0012  .I2  .21 
,0009  .64**  -.18  -.I2  -.S5  .02  ,2312.43  3.59**/24.63 
.0014  .14  .21  .23  .ll  .06 
.0006  .04  .06 
.ooo6  .05  .06  .12  .03*  .03 
,0004  .03  .05 
.OOO4  .04  .06  .13  .03  .02 
.OOO3  .02  .02 
,0003  .03  .02  .OS  .02  .03 
.0005  .04  .06 
.0010*  .77**  .14*  .16’  -.02  .04  ,9411.41  3.40120.34 
.OOO5  .07  .06  .09  .05  .07 
.OW3  .02  .02 
.OOO3  .03  .02  .05  .02  .02 
1981-82  -.0002  .75**  .15**  .9011.95  ,201.99 
-.0000  .65**  .11*  .08  .12  .01  ,9011.92  1.99116.29 
1983-84  ,0008  .64**  -.16  ,2512.44  6.68**/10.43 
1985-86  -.0017**  .76**  -.OM  ,8612.04  2.0916.17 
-  .0020**  .77**  -  .04*  -  .20  -  .06  .02  .86/1.96  .86*/33.03* 
1987-88  -.0008*  .74**  .11*  ,9011.92  .43/2.44 
-.0008*  .71**  .06  -.I6  .08*  -.01  .9011.95  .37/7.17 
1989-90  -.OOOO  .90**  .07**  ,9611.84  ,771.84 
-  .OOO1  .88**  .04*  .09‘  -  .02  .04  .96/1.86  .76/17.90 
1991-92  .0012*  .80**  .14*  ,9411.45  6.29**/6.18 
1979-92  -.0003  .78**  .07**  .79/2.19  2.70*/2.29 
-  .0002  .73**  .06*  .12*  .01  .03#  ,7912.19  1.8714.38 
Notes: “R2” refers to “R2  adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of  Swiss francs. 
**Statistically  significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically  significant at the 95 percent level. 
*Statistically  significant at the 90 percent level. 
#Statistically significant at the 85 percent level. 
yen, though significant in the early 1980s, lost its influence in the period 1983- 
86, and then reemerged with a statistically significant weight later in the de- 
cade, reaching .14 in  1991-92. 
Indonesian Rupiah 
Up  to  1982, the rupiah was  tightly pegged to the U.S. dollar, which ac- 
counted for 97 percent of  fluctuations. Beginning in  1983, the peg became 305  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 12.6  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Indonesian Rupiah (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  R2/D-W  Chowmite 
1979-80  .0000  1.00**  -.00  1.0012.99 
.OoOo  .oo  .00 
.OOOO  .99**  -.00  -.OO  -.01**  .02** 1.0012.49 
.oooo 
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1985-86  -  ,0050 
.0034 
-  .0062L 
,0039 
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.oo 
.02 
.01  -.03  -.01 
.03  .04  .08 
.32 
so 
.31  .03  .04 
.51  .55  .26 
.91** 
.34 
.97**  .61  -.19 
.35  .73  .17 
.08** 
.02 
.08**  .02 -.01 
.02  .05  .01 
.06** 
.02 
.06**  .05  .02 
.02  .04  .02 
.01 
.02 
.01  -.04  .01 
.02  .03  .02 
.16* 
.07 
.17*  -.OO  -.07 
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.I7 






































Nores: “Rz”  refers to “R2  adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of  Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99  percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95  percent level. 
XStatistically  significant at the 90  percent level. 
”Yjtatistically  significant at the 85 percent level. 
much looser, though the dollar still had the predominant role. Around 1985, a 
dramatic change occurred in Indonesian exchange rate policy: the yen  sud- 
denly received significant weight. In fact, the point estimate on the yen is actu- 
ally bigger than that on the dollar for the subperiod 1985-86. This is the period 
when Indonesia substantially increased the share of its international debt de- 
nominated in yen (see table 12.11). Subsequently the yen weight declined, dis- 
appearing altogether during the most recent subsample (1  99  1-92). 306  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Philippine Peso 
The peso has been firrnly pegged or closely linked to the U.S. dollar. At the 
same time, against the numeraire currency (Swiss franc), the central par value 
of the peso has also been steadily devalued more than the dollar. So far, it has 
shown absolutely no sign of following the movement of the yen. 
Table 12.7  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Philippine Peso (January 1, 1979-May  8, 1992) 
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.04 
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.02 
.03 
.05  .I0  -.I4 
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.05 
.56 
-.03  -.76  .00 
.57  .61  .28 
-.18 
.I4 
-.I9  .45  -.09 
.I4  .29  .07 
-  .04 
.06 
-.09  .OO  .06 
.06  .15  .04 
.05 
.07 
.08  -.08  .02 
.08  .I7  .09 
.o 1 
.18 
.05  -.06  -.23* 
.18  .26  .I4 
-.01 
.06 
-.01  -.05  -.05 
.06  .ll  .05 
-  .08 
.09 
-  .oo 
.02 
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,681  10.42 
Notes:  “R2”  refers to “Rz  adjusted for degrees of  freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standrard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99  percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95  percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 90  percent level. 
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Thai  Baht 
The baht too has followed relatively closely the movement of  the dollar. 
There was no clear role of the yen in Thai exchange rate policy prior to 1984. 
But the yen received a statistically significant weight of 0.10 during 1985-86, 
while the dollar weight declined to 0.71, from 0.91 at the beginning of  the 
Table 12.8  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining Changes in 
Value of Tahi Baht (January 1,1979-May  8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  RZID-W  ChowlWhite 
1979-80  -.0001” 
.oooo 
-  ,0002- 
,0001 





-  ,0029- 
.0017 
1985-86  ,0008” 
.0004 
-  .o009 
,0004 




1989-90  -.OOOl 
,0001 
-  .OOOO 
,0005 
199  1-92  -.OOO  1 
.0002 
-  ,0002 
,0002 
1979-92  -.0004 
.0003 
-  .o004 
,0003 
1983-84  -.0028” 
1.01**  .00 
.01  .01 
1.02**  .01 
.02  .01 
.95**  .05 
.06  .08 
1.16**  .13 
.19  .10 
1.31**  .26 
.15  .25 
1.32**  .26 
.17  .26 
.73**  .lo* 
.03  .04 
.71**  .lo* 
.03  .04 
.84**  -.00 
.06  .12 
.90**  .08 
.09  .I3 
.89**  .04 
.04  .04 
.74**  .02 
.06  .04 
.82**  .12** 
.01  .02 
.81**  .12** 
.02  .02 
.91**  .05” 
.02  .03 
.92**  .05” 
.03  .03 
1.0012.03  3.30112.44 
.00  -.OO  -.01  ,9911.94  2.30*/32.07* 
.02  .02  .02 
.76/2.04  .7911.04 
.11  -.37  .00  ,7611.99  ,6117.40 
.15  .27  .06 
S712.17  2.92*144.74** 
.03  .01  -.03  S612.18  1.60160.08** 
.28  .13  .07 
,9312.31  6.95**19.47 
.08  -  .01  .02  ,9312.24  4.04**/34.3  1  * 
.08  .02  .02 
,6912.53  ,3512.25 
.33  -.07  -.05  ,6912.47  1.54120.39 
.30  .07  .05 
,8612.99  1.0011.98 
.I1  .12**  .04  X812.91  2.50*141.02** 
.09  .04  .06 
,9912.61  .3814.90 
.07*  *  -  .O 1  .01  ,9912.70  3126.35 
.03  .02  .02 
.7512.24  5.45**17.33 
.03  -.01  -.OO  ,7512.24  3.14**117.81 
.06  .03  .02 
Notes:  “RZ”  refers to “R2  adjusted for degrees of  freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
‘Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
Y%tistically  significant at the 85 percent level. 308  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
sample. Evidently Thailand-like  Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia- 
shifted a bit from the dollar to the yen  in the mid-l980s, when the dollar was 
near its peak. During 1987-90,  this shift was reversed. And then from 1991 to 
May  1992, the yen  weight rose again to 0.12 (significant at the 99 percent 
level), with the remaining weight divided between the U.S. dollar and DM 
(0.81 and 0.07, respectively). As with the other East Asian currencies studied, 
the U.S. dollar currently remains more important than the yen. 
Chinese Yuan 
China claims to be on a basket peg. But the U.S. dollar is the only currency 
with whose value the yuan is highly correlated. From 1987 onward, the yuan 
has been relatively rigidly pegged to the dollar, although devaluations of  the 
par have also been frequent, particularly toward the end of the sample period. 
Neither the yen nor any other non-U.S.  dollar currency seems to play a role in 
the external value of the yuan. 
To summarize, to date the U.S. dollar has remained the dominant currency 
to which all the East Asian economies pay  attention in their exchange rate 
policies. The Japanese yen occupies some weight in some countries, but is still 
far from replacing the U.S. dollar in the region. We  now briefly consider other 
measures of international currency use, before turning to trade. 
12.2.2  The Use of the Dollar and Yen  in Invoicing 
It is interesting to observe that, even though the share of the Japanese econ- 
omy in the world economy has risen substantially, the internationalization of 
the yen has not tempted East Asian governments to link their currencies more 
strongly with the yen. Despite the fact that trading with Japan has become 
increasingly important for the East Asian developing countries, and reducing 
exchange rate volatility is thought to help trade in goods and services, the yen 
remains in low profile. Why? Developing and developed countries alike are 
known to invoice their trade in U.S.  dollars, rather than in their own or trading 
partners’ currencies. Given trade invoiced in dollars, pegging to the dollar cre- 
ates less exchange rate risk than pegging to the yen. But then the question 
becomes, Why is the dollar still the dominant currency in invoicing even for 
trade with Japan? 
There is some evidence that the yen  is being used more widely to invoice 
lending and trade in Asia. The countries that incurred large international debts 
in the 1970s and early 1980s subsequently shifted the composition away from 
dollar-denominated debt and toward yen-denominated debt. Table 12.10 shows 
that the share of trade denominated in yen is greater in Southeast Asia than in 
other regions and that there was an especially rapid increase from 1983  to 1990 
in the share of Southeast Asian imports denominated in yen. Table 12.11 shows 
that the yen  share among five major Asian debtors nearly doubled between 
1980 and 1988, entirely at the expense of the dollar (Tavlas and Ozeki [1991, 
19921 give further statistics and discussion). It is too early to tell whether this 309  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 12.9  Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies  in Determining Changes in 
Value of  Chinese Yuan (January 1,1979-May 8,1992) 
Years  Constant  Dollar  Yen  DM  Aus$  NZ$  R2/D-W  ChowiWhite 
1979-80  ,0007  1.09**  .02 
,0009  .07  .06 
.0008  1.00**  .02  .02  .05 
,0009  .17  .06  .I8  .20 
.OOO8  .05  .06 
1981-82  -.0020**  .05**  .14* 
-.0009  .10  .01  .28**  .38* 
,0007  .13  .07  .I0 
1983-84  -.0023**  .53**  -.07 
.0008  .07  .12 
-.0022**  .53**  -.04  .25’ 
.OOO8  .08  .12  .13 
,0015  .09  .14 
-.0023”  .94**  -.28”  -.07 
,0016  .12  .14  .30 
1987-88  .OOOO  1.00**  .006 
.m  .00  ,004 
-.oooO  1.00**  ,005  -.01 
.m  .00  .005  .01 
,0025  .19  .18 
-.0034  1.20**  -.I0  -.49 
,0026  .28  .20  .43 
,0002  .02  .03 
-.0006**  .98**  -.02  -.55 
,0002  .03  .03  .04 
BOO5  .04  .05 
.0005  .05  .05  .09 
1985-86  -.0027’  1.02**  -.26’ 
1989-90  -.0036”  1.04**  -.20 
1991-92  -.0007**  .98**  -.03 
1979-92  -.0018**  .87**  p.04 
-.0017**  .79**  -.06  .05 
.19 












,7612.53  .46110.41 
.05  ,7512.55  .39/33.72 
.14 
.65/1.99  1.3614.73 
.12**  ,7211.89  1.70113.16 
.04 
.42/1.95  7.81**14.90 
.02  ,4411.97  4.38**/20.79 
.03 
,6012.05  .5814.47 
.05  .6012.08  1.34/33.03* 
.07 
1  .OO/3.10  1.7311  1.39* 
.OO  1.00/3.09  1.00120.48 
.oo 
,2412.09  .I 111.36 
-.08  .22/2.15  .68/11.41 
.30 
,9912.15  ,6915.79 
.05”  ,9911.78  1.34129.7 
.03 
,5412.05  8.99**12.14 
.04  S412.06  5.71**110.97 
.03 
~~~  ~  ~ 
Notes: “R2” refers to “RZ  adjusted for degrees of freedom.” Numbers reported below coefficients 
are standard errors. All currencies are in terms of units of Swiss francs. 
**Statistically  significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically  significant at the 95 percent level. 
“Statistically  significant at the 90 percent level. 
*Statistically  significant at the  85 percent level. 
increase of  the role of the yen is a permanent trend. But for present purposes, 
the key point is that the share of  the yen  in the denomination of  trade and 
finance has not increased anywhere nearly as rapidly as has Japan’s  share in 
East Asian trade. 
Why should the dollar rather than the yen  continue to be the preferred in- 
voicing currency? Several explanations are generally given. First, short-term 310  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 12.10  Share of the Yen in Denomination of Foreign Trade (%) 
Denomination of  Exports  Denomination of Imports 
Southeast Asia  All Regions  Southeast Asia  All Regions 
~ 
1983  48.0  40.4  2.0  3.0 
1986  37.5  35.5  9.2  9.7 
1987  36.3  34.7  13.9  11.6 
1988  41.2  34.3  17.5  13.3 
1989  43.5  34.7  19.5  14.1 
1990  48.9  37.5  19.4  14.4 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Annual Report, as reported in Tavlas and Ozeki (1992, 33). 
Table 12.11  Yen Share in Debt Denomination and Official Reserve Holdings (%) 
Yen Share in 
Official 
Holdings  Yen  Share in External Debt 












20.0  16.6  19.0 
19.3  14.1  16.9 
21.0  12.3  13.3 
23.3  12.5  14.2 
25.0  12.8  21.2 
31.7  16.7  26.4 
33.9  22.0  30.4 
39.4  27.2  35.7 
39.3  29.5  37.1 











25.5  19.5  13.9  4.4 
23.2  17.8  15.5  4.2 
24.0  17.2  17.6  4.7 
27.3  18.5  15.5  5.0 
29.2  20.3  16.3  5.8 
36.1  25.8  26.9  8.0 
39.9  29.3  22.9  7.9 
43.1  36.0  30.0  7.5 
43.5  37.9  26.7  7.7 
40.9  35.7  17.5  7.9 
17.1  9.1 
Source: Tavlas and Ozeki (1992, 39). 
*Selected Asian countries (not including Japan). 
financial markets, particularly bankers’ acceptances, are not as well-developed 
in Japan as in, for example, New  York or London, so that the yen is a less 
convenient currency in which to finance trade. One possibility is that Japan 
itself resists the internationalization of the yen in order to avoid large fluctua- 
tions of its reserves, or to avoid destabilizing effects on its domestic price level, 
and thus that the slow internationalization of Japanese financial markets is gov- 
ernment policy.’ Second, a large percentage of  Japanese trade is conducted by 
the huge trading firms called sogo shosha; they are more able to diversify and 
7. At the time of the yeddollar talks in 1984, the Japanese government was not enthusiastic 
about internationalizing the yen (Frankel 1984). More recently, some Japanese have come to favor 
it. Suzuki (1991, 26-30)  thinks that internationalizing the yen in East Asia would be a good idea. 311  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
hedge claims and liabilities in a foreign currency than would be a small ex- 
porter or importer. Third, oil, minerals, and other raw materials and basic com- 
modities occupy a large share of trade in East Asia, because Japan must import 
so much and Southeast Asia exports so much; such commodities tend every- 
where to be invoiced in dollars. Fourth, a high percentage of East Asian trade 
is with the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, where the 
dollar is the dominant international currency. Fifth, Japanese firms are believed 
to undertake “pricing to market,” especially in the U.S. export market, because 
they are readier than U.S. firms to suffer short-run fluctuations in their profits 
for the sake of maintaining market share.* 
There is a strong “multiple equilibrium” or “coordination” aspect to the in- 
ternational currency problem. Krugman (1980, 1984) modeled the worldwide 
economies of  scale in the choice of international currency. Any country ex- 
pecting to use the dollar as the invoicing currency for the next transaction pre- 
fers to use the dollar as the invoicing currency in this round. The result is 
that there are multiple (locally stable) equilibria in the choice of international 
currency, and the dollar (or the pound before it) could remain the dominant 
currency even after the patterns of trade and production have shifted. 
As long as the dollar remains the dominant invoicing currency in interna- 
tional trade and lending, it makes sense for the East Asian economies to con- 
tinue to assign heavy weights to the dollar. Of  course, the economies-of-scale 
analysis that applies to the choice of an international currency for invoicing 
trade also applies to the choice of an international currency for pegging and 
other uses. 
An analogy with the English language can be, and has been, made. A foreign 
visitor to China is likely to encounter on the street two requests more than any 
others: a request for dollars (in exchange for local currency) and a request to 
speak English (so that the person can practice). It is not the superior intrinsic 
qualities of the language, or the currency, that they are after, nor is it especially 
the prestige of the United States. Rather, English is rapidly becoming the lin- 
gua franca of  Asia, as it is of the world, simply because the world needs a 
lingua franca, and there is no other obvious choice. The same may be true of 
the dollar. 
12.3  Is There a Regional Trade Bloc Centered on Japan? 
There is no standard definition of a “trade bloc.” A useful definition might 
be a group of countries who are concentrating their trading relationships with 
each other, in preference to the rest of the world. One might wish to add to the 
definition the criterion that this concentration is the outcome of government 
8.  Reasons for the disproportionately low use of the yen in invoicing are given in Frankel (1984). 
It0 (1992), and Tavlas  and Ozeki (1992). Frankel (1991~)  considers the international currency 
question and gives further references. 312  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
policy, or perhaps of factors that are noneconomic in origin, such as a common 
language or culture. In two out of the three parts of the world, there have clearly 
been recent deliberate political steps toward economic integration, as noted at 
the outset of this paper. 
In East Asia, by contrast, overt preferential trading arrangements or other 
political moves to promote regional economic integration are lacking. The As- 
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, to be sure, are tak- 
ing steps in the direction of turning what used to be a regional security group 
into a free trade area of sorts. But when Americans worry, as they are wont to 
do, about a trading bloc forming in Asia, it is generally not ASEAN that con- 
cerns them. Rather it is the possibility of  an East Asian bloc dominated by 
Japan. 
In fact, Japan is unusual among major countries in not having preferential 
trading arrangements with smaller neighboring countries. But the hypothesis 
that has been put forward is that Japan is forming an economic bloc in the 
same way that it runs its economy: by means of policies that are implicit, indi- 
rect, and invisible. Specifically, the hypothesis is that Japan operates, by means 
of such instruments as flows of aid, foreign direct investment, and other forms 
of finance, to influence its neighbors’ trade toward itself (for one of many ex- 
amples, see Dornbusch 1989).  This is a hypothesis that should not be accepted 
uncritically, but rather needs to be examined empirically. 
We  must begin by  acknowledging the obvious: the greatly increased eco- 
nomic  weight  of  East  Asian  countries in  the  world  economy. The  rapid 
outward-oriented growth of Japan, followed by the four East Asian NICs and 
more recently by some of the other ASEAN countries, is one of the most re- 
markable and widely remarked trends in the world economy over the last three 
decades. But when one asks whether a yen bloc is forming in East Asia, one is 
presumably asking something more than whether the economies are getting 
larger, or even whether economic flows among them are increasing. One must 
ask whether the share of intraregional trade is higher, or increasing more rap- 
idly, than would be predicted based on such standard economic factors as the 
GNP or growth rates of the countries involved. 
12.3.1 
Table  12.12 reports three alternative ways of computing intraregional trade 
bias. The first part of the table is based on a simple breakdown of trade (exports 
plus imports) undertaken by countries in East Asia, into trade with other mem- 
bers of the same regional grouping versus trade with other parts of the world.9 
For comparison, the analogous statistics are reported for Western Europe (the 
EC12) and for North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico). 
The share of  intraregional trade in East Asia increased from 33 percent in 
1980 to 37 percent in 1989. Pronouncements that a clubbish trade bloc is form- 
Adjusting Intraregional Trade for Growth 
9. These statistics are presented in more detail in table 1 in Frankel (1991a). 313  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Table 12.12  Summary Measures of Intraregional ’kade Jiiases 
~  ~~ 
Pacific  North  European 
Year  Asia  America  Community 
1. Intraregional trade/total trade  1980  .33  .32  .5  1 
1986  .32  .35  .57 
1989  .37  .36  .59 
2. Intraregional bias holding  1980  2.2  1.9  1.3 
constant for size of exports  1989  1.9  1.9  1.5 
Pacific  Western  European 
Asia  Hemisphere  Community 
3. Intraregional bias holding  1980  .70  .53  .23 
constant for GNP,  1985  .40  .34  .44 
population, distance, etc.  1990  .60  .97  .46 
Sources:  I, Schott (1991); Direction of  Trade, (Washington, D.C.:  International Monetary Fund, 
various issues), as computed in Frankel (1991~).  2, computed as the ratio of line 1 to shares of 
world trade, as in Frankel (1991a). 3, gravity regressions, reported in tables 2, 3, and 4, respec- 
tively, Frankel  (1992a). They  include also  significant coefficients  on  the APEC  bloc, among 
other variables. 
ing in the region are usually based on figures such as these. But the numbers 
are deceptive. It is easy to be misled by intraregional trade shares such as those 
reported in table 12.12. If one allows for the phenomenon that most of the East 
Asian countries in the  1980s experienced rapid growth in  total output and 
trade, then in fact there has been no movement toward intraregional bias in the 
evolving pattern of trade. The increase in the intraregional share of trade that 
is observed in table 12.12 could be entirely due to the increase in the economic 
size of the countries. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation that corrects 
trade shares for the size of the partner countries, reported in table 12.12, item 
2, shows that this is indeed the case.’O The East Asian bias toward within- 
region trade, far from rising, actually diminished slightly in the 1980s! 
12.3.2  A Test on Bilateral Trade Flows 
The analysis should be elaborated by  use of  a systematic framework for 
measuring what patterns of bilateral trade are normal around the world: the so- 
called gravity model.” A dummy variable can then be added to represent when 
both countries in a given pair belong to the same regional grouping, and one 
10. Frankel (1992a). This conclusion also emerges for time-spans stretching farther back in 
history. Economists such as Drysdale and Gamaut (1992), Anderson and Norheim (1992), and 
Petri (1992a) have been reporting this for some time, based on similar calculations of “intensity 
of trade indexes” or “double-relative measures.” 
11. Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) have recently applied the gravity 
model to the question of potential Eastern European trade patterns, and Wang (1992) to China’s 
trade. They and Frankel (1992a) give references on the gravity model. 314  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
can check whether the level and trend in the East AsiaPacific grouping ex- 
ceeds that in other groupings. We do not currently have measures of historical, 
political, cultural, and linguistic ties. Thus it will be possible to interpret the 
dummy variables as  reflecting these factors, rather than necessarily as  re- 
flecting discriminatory trade policies. Perhaps we should not regret the merg- 
ing of these different factors in one term, because as noted there are in any 
case no overt preferential trading arrangements on which theories of a Japanese 
trading bloc could rely. 
The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between 
pairs of countries in a given year. We have 63 countries in our data set, so that 
there are 1,953 data points (= 63 X 62/2) for a given year. The goal, again, is 
to see how much of the high level of trade within the East Asian region can be 
explained by  simple economic factors common to bilateral trade throughout 
the world and how much is left over to be attributed to a special regional 
effect. 
One would expect the two  most important factors in explaining bilateral 
trade flows to be the geographical distance between the two countries and their 
economic sizes. These factors are the essence of the gravity model. A large 
part of the apparent bias toward intraregional trade is certainly due to simple 
geographical proximity. Indeed Krugman (1991b) suggests that most of it may 
be due to proximity, so that the three trading blocs are welfare-improving "nat- 
ural" groupings (as distinct from "unnatural" trading arrangements between 
distant trading partners such as the United States and Israel). Although the 
importance of  distance and transportation costs is clear, there is not a lot of 
theoretical guidance on precisely how they should enter. A bit of experimenta- 
tion with  functional forms is described in Frankel (1992a). We  also add a 
dummy ADJACENT variable to indicate when two countries share a common 
land border. 
The equation to be estimated is: 
lOg(q,) = a  + Pllog(GNf',GNf',)  + P,~o~[(GNP/P~P),(GNP/P~P),I 
+  P,log(DISTANCE) + PJADJACENT) + y,(EECJ 
+ y*(WH,) + y,(ASIA,,)  + u,,. 
The last four explanatory factors are dummy variables. 
Entering GNPs in product form can be easily justified by the modern theory 
of trade under imperfect c~mpetition.'~  In addition there is reason to believe 
that GNP per capita has a positive effect, for a given size: as countries become 
12. The list of countries, regional groupings, and cities used to compute distances, is given in 
an appendix to Frankel (1992a). 
13. The specification implies that trade between two equal-sized countries (say, of size .5) will 
be greater than trade between a large and a small country (say, of sizes .9 and .1). This property 
of models with imperfect competition is not a property of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
of  comparative advantage. See Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 1.5). 
Foundations for the gravity model are also offered by Anderson (1979) and other papers surveyed 
by Deardorff (1984,503-6). 315  Yen  Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
more developed, they tend to specialize more and to trade more. Other gravity 
model studies often estimate separate equations for exports and imports and 
allow the coefficients on GNP and GNP per capita (or, equivalently, popula- 
tion) to differ between the importing and exporting country. When we aggre- 
gated exports and imports, we implicitly assumed that these elasticities were 
symmetric. Our motivation in estimating the equation in terms of exports plus 
imports is to eliminate the macroeconomic factors, such as real exchange rate 
fluctuations and relative positions in the business cycle, that necessarily influ- 
ence the level of exports and the level of imports considered individually.I4 
The results are reported in tables 2, 3, and 4 of Frankel (1992a). We  found 
all three standard variables to be highly significant statistically (>  99 percent 
level). The coefficient on the log of distance was about -  .56, when the adja- 
cency variable (which is also highly significant statistically) is included at the 
same time. This means that when the distance between two nonadjacent coun- 
tries is higher by  1 percent, the trade between them falls by about .56 percent. 
The estimated coefficient on GNP per capita is about .29 as of 1980, indicat- 
ing that richer countries do indeed trade more, though this term declines during 
the 1980s, reaching .08 in  1990. The estimated coefficient for the log of the 
product of the two countries’ GNPs is about .75, indicating that, though trade 
increases with size, it increases less than proportionately (holding GNP per 
capita constant). This presumably reflects the widely known pattern that small 
economies tend to be more open to international trade than larger, more diver- 
sified, economies. 
If  there were nothing to the notion of trading blocs, then these basic vari- 
ables would soak up most of the explanatory power. There would be little left 
to attribute to a dummy variable representing whether two trading partners are 
both located in the same region. In this case, the level and trend in intraregional 
trade would be due solely to the proximity of the countries and their rapid rate 
of overall economic growth. But we found that dummy variables for intraregio- 
nal trade are statistically significant, both in East Asia and elsewhere in the 
world. If  two countries are both located in the Western Hemisphere for ex- 
ample, they will trade with each other by  an estimated 70 percent more than 
they would otherwise, even after taking into account distance and the other 
gravity variables (exp(S3) = 1-70).  Intraregional trade goes beyond what can 
be explained naturally by proximity. 
It  is as yet  difficult to draw conclusions regarding economic welfare, be- 
cause the empirical equation is too far removed from theoretical foundations. 
But it seems possible that the amount of intraregional bias explained by prox- 
imity, as compared to explicit or implicit regional trading arrangements, is 
small enough in our results that those arrangements are welfare-reducing. This 
14. The results in Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) show coefficient 
estimates for importing and exporting countries that are fairly close, but nonetheless show non- 
overlapping confidence intervals. Our estimates are extremely close to  theirs for the  importing 
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could be the case if trade-diversion outweighs trade creation. Inspired by Krug- 
man’s  (1991a, 1991b) “natural trading bloc” terminology, we might then refer 
to the observed intraregional trade bias as evidence of “supernatural” trading 
blocs. 
When the boundaries of the Asian bloc are drawn along the lines of those 
suggested by  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir in his proposed East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), which excludes Australia and New Zealand, the 
coefficient on the Asian bloc appears to be stronger than that on the European 
or Western Hemisphere blocs. Even when the boundaries are drawn in this way, 
however, there is no evidence of an increase in the intraregional bias of Asian 
trade during the 1980s: the estimated coefficient actually decreases somewhat 
from  1980 to  1990. Thus the  gravity  results corroborate the back-of-the- 
envelope calculation noted in section 12.3.1. The precise pattern is a decrease 
in the first half of the decade, followed by a very slight increase in the second 
half, matching the results of Petri (1991).15  None of these changes over time is 
statistically significant. 
It is perhaps surprising that the estimated level of intraregional trade bias 
was higher in East Asia as of 1980 than in the other two regions. One possible 
explanation is that there has historically been a sort of  “trading culture” in 
Asia. To the extent that such a culture exists and can be identified with a partic- 
ular nation or ethnic group, we find the overseas Chinese to be a more plausible 
factor than the Japanese. 
Of the three trading blocs, the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the Western Hemisphere are the two that show rapid intensification in  the 
course of the 1980s. Both show an approximate doubling of their estimated 
intraregional bias coefficients. As of  1980, trade within the EEC is not strong 
enough--after  holding constant for the close geographical proximity and high 
incomes per capita of  European countries-for  the bias coefficient of  .2 to 
appear statistically significant. The EEC coefficient increased rapidly in level 
and significance  in the first half of the 1980s, reaching about .4 by  1985, and 
continued to increase a bit in the second half. The effect of two countries being 
located in Europe per se, when tested, does not show up as being nearly as 
strong in magnitude or significance as the effect of membership in the EEC. 
The Western Hemisphere coefficient experienced all its increase in the sec- 
ond half of the decade, exceeding .9 by  1990. The rapid increase in Western 
Hemisphere intraregional bias in the second half of  the 1980s is in itself an 
important new  finding. The recovery of  Latin American imports from the 
United States after the compression that followed the 1982 debt crisis must be 
part of this phenomenon. The Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement signed in 
1988 may also be part of the explanation. 
We consider a sequence of nested candidates for trading blocs in the Pacific. 
15. Petri infers, from the data on intraregional trade shares, a decrease in East Asian interdepen- 
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The significance of a given bloc effect turns out to depend on what other blocs 
are tested at the same time. One logical way to draw the boundaries is to in- 
clude all the countries with eastern coasts on the Pacific.I6  We  call this group- 
ing “Asian Pacific” in the tables. Its coefficient and significance level both 
appear higher than the EAEC dummy. But when we broaden the bloc search 
and  test  for  an  effect of  the  Asian  Pacific Economic Cooperation group 
(APEC), which includes the United States and Canada in with the others, it is 
highly significant. The significance of  the Asian Pacific dummy completely 
disappears, and that of the EAEC dummy returns. 
It appears that APEC is the correct place to draw the boundary. The APEC 
effect is striking: the United States and Canada appear to be full partners in 
the Pacific bloc, even while simultaneously belonging to the significant but 
distinct Western Hemisphere bloc. The APEC coefficient is the strongest of 
any.  Its estimate holds relatively steady at  1.5 (1980),  1.3 (1985), and  1.4 
(1990).” 
One possible explanation for the apparent intraregional trade biases within 
East Asia and within the APEC grouping is that transportation between Pacific 
Asian countries is mostly by  water, while transportation among European or 
Western Hemisphere countries is more often over land, and that ocean shipping 
is less expensive than shipping by rail or road.I8  This issue bears further investi- 
gation. The issue of  water versus land transport should not affect results re- 
garding changes in intraregional trade bias in the 1980s, however, given that 
the nature of  shipping costs does not appear to have changed over as short a 
time span as five or ten years. 
Several further questions naturally arise. In 1977,  ASEAN negotiated a pref- 
erential trading arrangement within its membership (although serious progress 
in removal of  barriers did not get underway until 1987). In early 1992, the 
members proclaimed plans for an ASEAN Free Trade Area, albeit with exemp- 
tions for many sectors. Does this grouping constitute a small bloc nested within 
the others? We  include in our model a dummy variable for common member- 
ship in ASEAN. It turns out to have a significant coefficient only if none of the 
broader Asian blocs are included. The conclusion seems to be that ASEAN is 
not in fact functioning as a trade bloc.’g 
16. This is the grouping used in table 12.12. 
17. Others have reported the high volume of  trans-Pacific trade. But it has been difficult to 
evaluate such statistics when no account is taken of these countries’ collective size. A higher 
percentage of economic activity in a larger region will consist of  intraregional trade than in a 
smaller region, even when there is no intraregional bias, merely because smaller regions tend by 
their nature to trade across their boundaries more than larger ones. In the limit, when the unit is 
the world, 100 percent of trade is intra-“regional.” 
18. Wang (1992) enters land distance and water distance separately in a gravity model. She finds 
a small, though statistically significant, difference in coefficients. 
19. In tests similar to ours, Hamilton and Winters (1992), Wang (1992), and Wang and Winters 
(1991) found the ASEAN dummy to reflect one of the most significant trading areas in the world. 
That they did not include a broader dummy variable for intra-Asian trade may explain the differ- 
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We  have carried out some other extensions elsewhere. In Frankel (1992a), 
we  allow for the greater openness of East Asian countries generally, and of 
Hong Kong and Singapore in particular. These dummy variables are highly 
significant. The inclusion of  each variable has relatively little effect on the 
coefficients of the original variables in the equation (with a coefficient of  .9) 
when it is included, but the net effect of all of them (particularly the simultane- 
ous presence of  the APEC bloc variable and Asian openness variable) is to 
diminish the East Asian bloc variable to borderline significance.  We also disag- 
gregated trade into manufactured goods, agricultural products, fuels, and other 
raw materials. In Frankel and Wei (1993), we undertake still more extensions, 
such as  including factor  endowment terms, estimating openness or trade- 
diversion effects in other parts of the world, and checking for robustness with 
respect to heteroscedasticity and the omission of  zero-trade points. In each 
case, the results changed little. 
To summarize the most relevant effects, if two countries both lie within the 
boundaries of  APEC, they trade with each other 100 percent more than they 
otherwise would. The nested EAEC bloc is less strong, and  has  declined 
slightly in magnitude and significance during the course of  the  1980s. The 
Western Hemisphere and EC blocs, by contrast, intensified rapidly during the 
decade. Indeed, by  1990, the Western Hemisphere bloc was stronger than the 
EAEC bloc, if one takes into account the existence of the APEC effect. There 
was never a special Japan effect within Pacific Asia. 
In short, beyond the evident facts that countries near each other trade more 
with each other, and that East Asian countries are growing rapidly, there is no 
evidence that they are collectively moving toward a trade bloc in the way that 
Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere appear to be. 
12.4  The Correlation between Bilateral Exchange Rate Variability and 
Bilateral Trade Flows 
12.4.1  The Role of Exchange Rate Stabilization 
One rationale for assigning weight to a particular currency in determining 
one’s exchange rate is the assumption that a more stable bilateral exchange rate 
will help promote bilateral trade with the partner in question. This is a major 
motivation for exchange rate stabilization in Europe. There have been quite a 
few time-series studies of the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade over- 
all,*O  but fewer cross-sectional studies of bilateral trade. 
One exception is De Grauwe (1988), which looks at only ten industrialized 
countries (and is motivated in part by  the European experience). Two others 
20. For example, Hooper and Kohlhagen  (1978), Kenen and Rodrik (1986), and Akhtar and 
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are Abrams (1980) and Brada and Mendez (1988). We  will reexamine the 
question here using a data set that is more recent as well as broader, covering 
63 countries. A problem of simultaneous causality should be noted at the out- 
set: if exchange rate variability shows up with an apparent negative effect on 
the volume of  bilateral trade, it could be due to the government’s efforts to 
stabilize the currency vis-i-vis a valued trading partner as easily as the reverse. 
With this consideration, we will also use the method of instrumental variable 
estimation to tackle the possible simultaneity bias. 
Volatility is defined to be the variance of the first difference of the logarith- 
mic exchange rate. We  start with the volatility of nominal exchange rates and 
embed this term in our gravity equation for 1980, 1985, and 1990. The results 
are reported in table 12.13. Most coefficients are similar to those reported in 
the earlier results without exchange rate variability, though the majority of the 
bloc dummy variables appear with slightly lower coefficients, suggesting that 
a bit of the bloc effect may have been attributable to exchange rate links. In 
1980, the coefficient for the volatility term is indeed negative and statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level. The magnitude is moderately small. On aver- 
age, a one percent increase in the standard deviation reduces bilateral trade 
by 0.046 percent, holding constant all other variables. In  1985, the volatility 
parameter is no longer significant (with the point estimate turning positive). In 
1990, the volatility coefficient becomes positive and statistically significant at 
the 99 percent level. 
These puzzling results need not be taken at face value, since a presumably 
more relevant measure of  exchange rate uncertainty is the volatility of  real 
exchange rates, which takes into account the differential inflation rates in the 
two countries in addition to movements in nominal exchange rates. Regres- 
sions with the volatility of real exchange rates are also presented in table 12.13. 
In 1980, the volatility parameter is still negative (-0.66)  and statistically sig- 
nificant. The parameter for 1985 is negative, though still insignificant. In sharp 
contrast to the regression with the volatility of  nominal rates, the volatility 
parameter for 1990 is a statistically significant negative number (-0.48). In 
short, these results are consistent with one’s  prior expectation that real ex- 
change rate volatility depresses bilateral trade. The change in the intraregional 
bias coefficients when exchange rate volatility is included in the equation also 
suggest that part of the regional trade bloc effects reported above for Europe 
and the Western Hemisphere were attributable to patterns of  exchange rate 
variability. This would appear to be a piece of  evidence that the stabiliza- 
tion of  exchange rates within Europe has helped to promote intra-European 
trade. 
Even part of  the Pacific term appears to be attributable to exchange rate 
patterns, which one could interpret as the effect of the strong role played by 
the dollar throughout the region. The East Asian coefficient, on the other hand, 
is not at all reduced by the presence of the exchange rate volatility term. This Table 12.13  Exchange Rate Volatility and Bilateral Trade (OLS estimation) 
Adjusted 
Volatility  GNP  GNP/pop  DISTANCE  ADJACENT  WH  EEC  EAEC  APEC  R2  SEE 
1980 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
1985 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
1990 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
.74**  .29**  -.56** 
.02  .02  .04 
-.046*  .76**  .26**  -.68** 
,023  .02  .02  .05 
,029  .02  .02  .05 
-.066*  .74**  .27**  -.67** 
.76**  .25**  -.70** 
.02  .02  .04 
,015  .77**  .24**  -.74** 
,021  .02  .02  .05 
-.026  .76**  .24**  -.75** 
.028  .02  .02  .05 
.75**  .09**  -.56** 
.02  .02  .04 
.076**  .77**  .09**  -.66** 
,014  .02  .02  .04 
-.048**  .79**  .I]**  -.60** 



















.52**  .23 
.I5  .18 
.I6  .03 
.23  .18 
.18  .04 
.20  .20 
.33**  .44* 
.I6  .I7 
.23  .43* 
.18  .I7 
.01  .26# 
.20  .I7 
.92**  .47** 
.14  .I6 
.82**  .54** 
.I4  .I6 
.51**  .27" 
.17  .I7 
.88** 1.51** 
.27  .I7 
1.04**  1.35** 
.37  .20 
.96**  1.38** 
.37  .22 
.59*  1.28** 
.26  .I7 
.79*  1.18** 
.36  .19 
.72*  1.12** 
.36  .21 
.69*  1.36** 
.24  .I5 
.75*  1.36** 
.33  .I7 
.95*  1.06** 
.38  .28 
.71  1.20 
.73  1.20 
.76  1.14 
.74  1.17 
.75  1.16 
.78  1.12 
.77  1.07 
.79  1.04 
.83  .97 
Nores:All  the variables except the dummies are in logarithm. All the regressions have an intercept for which the estimate is not reported 
here. Standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
%atistically  significant at the 90 percent level. 
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result is what we would expect, in light of our findings in the first part of the 
paper that most of the East Asian currencies still give much less weight (if any 
at all) to the yen than to the dollar. 
All such interpretations are threatened however, by the likelihood of simul- 
taneity bias in the above regressions. Governments may choose deliberately to 
stabilize bilateral exchange rates with their major trading partners. This has 
certainly been the case in Europe, for example. Hence, there could be a strong 
correlation between trade patterns and currency linkages even if exchange rate 
volatility does not depress trade. To address this problem, we use the method of 
instrumental variable estimation, with the standard deviation of relative money 
supply as our instrument for the volatility of exchange rates.21  The results are 
reported in table 12.14. 
Let us concentrate our discussion on the regressions involving real exchange 
rates. In 1980, the volatility parameter is still negative and significant at the 90 
percent level. But the magnitude (-0.10)  is smaller than without using the 
instrument, suggesting that part of the apparent depressing effect of volatility 
was  indeed due to the simultaneity bias. (Also, the presence of the volatil- 
ity term no longer produces a clear drop in the EC and WH bloc terms.) Sim- 
ilarly in  1985, the volatility parameter has a correspondingly smaller point 
estimate and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, in 1990, the 
volatility parameter turns again into a positive number (0.32) which is signifi- 
cant at the 99 percent level. 
These results suggest that if exchange rate volatility did depress bilateral 
trade, its negative effect appears to have diminished over the course of  the 
1980s. This sharp change is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation 
is the rapid development of exchange-risk hedging instruments. In particular, 
futures and forward markets for a broad range of currencies came into much 
wider use in the 1980s. Currency options were introduced in the United States 
at the end of  1982 on the pounddollar, yerddollar, and DWdollar rates and 
soon spread to cover virtually all major currencies by late 1980s. The use of 
currency swaps was also on the rise. The market in financial instruments to 
hedge against exchange rate fluctuations, in addition to expanding in scope, 
has also become more efficient, lowering costs to hedgers.22 
If exchange rate volatility no longer seriously depresses bilateral trade, then 
whether East Asian countries stabilize their currencies against the yen will not 
directly affect their trading volume with Japan and with each other. The gravity 
21. The argument in favor of this choice of instrument is that relative money supplies and bilat- 
eral exchange rates are highly correlated, in theory (they are directly linked under the monetary 
theory of  exchange rate determination), and in our data as well, but  monetary policies are less 
likely than exchange rate policies to respond to bilateral trade. 
22. The costs of doing foreign exchange transactions are themselves related to the volatility of 
the exchange rate. For a recent theoretic and empirical study on the relationship between bid-ask 
spreads and volatility, see Wei (1991). After controlling for volatility, Glassman (1987) finds some 
evidence that transaction costs in the foreign exchange market have decreased over time. Table 12.14  Exchange Rate Volatility and Bilateral Wade (instrumental variable estimation) 
Adjusted 
Volatility  GNP  GNP/pop  DISTANCE  ADJACENT  WH  EEC  EAEC  APEC  R2  SEE 
1980 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
1985 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
1990 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
-.008xx  .73**  .27** 
.005  .02  .02 
-.010*  .73**  .26** 
,005  .02  .02 
-.@I  .76**  .24** 
.005  .02  .02 
-.000  .76**  .25** 
,005  .02  .02 
.029**  .77**  .15** 
.005  .02  .02 
.032**  .77**  .15** 
,005  .02  .02 
-.56** 
.04 






















.54**  .20  .93** 
.I5  .18  .27 
.56**  .22  .94** 
.I5  .I8  .27 
.34*  .43*  .59* 
.I6  .I7  .26 
.33*  .43*  .59* 
.16  .I7  .26 
.88**  .44**  .47* 
.I4  .I6  .24 
.87**  .43**  .4Y 

























Nores: All the variables except the dummies are in  logarithm. All the regressions have an intercept for which the estimate is not 
reported here. Standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. 
**Statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
'Statistically  significant at the 90 percent level. 
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regressions reported here bear further investigation to test the robustness of 
the  relationship^.^^ 
12.5  Is It Japan or the United States That Wants the Yen to Play a 
Greater Role in East Asia? 
An important question related to the issue of yen bloc has thus far been left 
unanswered. Are the financial and monetary trends of the increased importance 
of  the yen, to the extent they exist at all, the outcome of  deliberate policy 
measures on the part of Japan? Gradually increasing use of the yen internation- 
ally is primarily the outcome of private decisions by importers, exporters, bor- 
rowers, and lenders. It is difficult to see signs of deliberate policy actions taken 
by the Japanese government to increase its financial and monetary influence in 
Asia. On the contrary, at least until recently, the Japanese government was in- 
clined to resist whatever tendency there was for the yen to become an interna- 
tional currency in competition with the dollar. 
It has been the U.S. government, in the Yen/Dollar Agreement of  1984 and 
in subsequent negotiations, that has been pushing Japan to internationalize the 
yen, to promote its worldwide use in trade, finance, and central bank policies 
(Frankel 1984). It has also been the U.S. government that has been pushing 
Korea  and the other East  Asian  NICs to  open up  their financial markets, 
thereby allowing Japanese capital and Japanese financial institutions to enter 
these countries. It has again been the U.S. government that has been pushing 
Korea and Taiwan to move away from policies to stabilize the value of their 
currencies against the dollar.” An increasing role for the yen in Pacific Asia 
may or may not be a good idea. But it is an idea that originated in Washington, 
not in Tokyo. 
12.5.1  Negotiations on the Korean Won 
Korea and Taiwan were singled out by the U.S. Treasury in 1989, to “liberal- 
ize” their foreign exchange rate policies, with the implied outcome of being 
delinked from the dollar. Here, we study the case of Korea to illustrate the role 
of U.S.  pressure in East Asian exchange rate policies. 
Korea maintained a fixed exchange rate against the dollar in the late 1970s. 
As the inflation rate was higher at home than abroad, the won became progres- 
sively more overvalued in real terms, and exports suffered as a result. In 1979 
the government enacted an important and needed program of  macroeconomic 
stabilization and microeconomic reform. In January 1980 the won devalued by 
20 percent. This devaluation, and the contractionary macroeconomic measures 
23. We plan, for example, to include terms for factor endowments, levels of trade barriers, and 
political and linguistic associations. 
24. Balassa and Williamson (1990), Noland (1990), and Frankel (1989). Financial negotiations 
between the U.S. Treasury and the governments of  Korea and Taiwan were a response to congres- 
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taken in the preceding year, succeeded in stimulating rapid export growth and 
reducing the current account deficit. This left Korea as one of the few major 
debtors that was well positioned when the 1982 international debt crisis hit 
(Balassa and Williamson 1990; Collins and Park 1989; Kim 1990). 
The official exchange rate policy in 1980 became one of defining the won’s 
value in terms of a basket of five foreign currencies, rather than just the dollar.25 
Korea, as many other countries on a basket peg do, does not publicly announce 
what the currency weights are. The IMF was perceptive enough to classify 
Korea as a “managed floater” rather than a “basket-pegger.” Test like those 
reported in section 12.2 (table 12.1) confirm that nondollar currencies in fact 
played very little role in this “basket.” 
The phase of dollar depreciation that began in  1985, as represented by the 
Plaza Accord, was welcomed in Korea as one of “three blessings” in the world 
economic environment: low dollar, low interest rates, and low oil prices. For 
two years Korea kept the won close to the dollar, which meant a substantial 
depreciation against the yen and other currencies, and basked in the stimulus 
to its exports. But the country responded to U.S.  pressure by  appreciating the 
won against the dollar in 1987 and 1988. 
The U.S. government has continued to press Korea to delink the won from 
the dollar. The U.S. Treasury’s October 1989 report announced: “Recently, the 
Treasury and the Korean Ministry of Finance have agreed to initiate talks on 
financial policies, including the exchange rate system and capital market is- 
sues. We  hope to encourage a more market-oriented exchange rate system in 
Korea within the framework of these talks” (U.S. Department of the Treasury 
1989, 29). Two  rounds of  financial policy talks took place in February and 
November 1990. Those talks did not explicitly focus on the level of the won/ 
dollar rate per se. Rather, the United States sought to “encourage the liberaliza- 
tion of  Korea’s exchange rate system and of the capital and interest rate con- 
trols that impede the full operation of  market forces.” Just what is meant by 
“market-oriented exchange rate system” or “liberalization”? Given  that the 
won had been rigidly targeted to the dollar, a liberalization implies a delinking. 
It was expected by the U.S. government that the won would appreciate against 
the dollar as a consequence of the “liberalization.” Since bilateral trade and 
investment between Korea and Japan are large and increasingly important, an- 
other natural outcome would be a new degree of linkage between the won and 
the yen. 
On March 2, 1990, the Korean authorities adopted a “market average rate” 
(MAR) system of setting the exchange rate each week (Hwang 1990, 15). This 
reform led the U.S.  Treasury to drop charges of exchange rate manipulation in 
its April 1990 report, where the earlier won appreciation was apparently not 
sufficient to convince it to do so. The U.S. Treasury in its May  1991 report 
25. Supposedly, according to Lindner (1991, 5)  and Wang (1991, 3). the basket includes the 
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found: “During the first thirteen months of the MAR system (through April 
12, 1991), the won  depreciated 4.4 in nominal terms against the dollar. .  . . 
Foreign banks accounted for a large share of  transactions in the inter-bank 
market, generally 40-60  percent of the total. The Bank of Korea (BOK) was 
not a direct participant in the market, and other government-owned banks ac- 
counted for only a small share of inter-bank activity” (1991, 15). This sounds 
like a genuinely market-oriented system. 
The U.S. Treasury notes in the same 1991 report, however, that “the Korean 
authorities maintain a comprehensive array of  controls on foreign exchange 
and capital flows.” Our regression result in section 12.2 actually provides a 
suggestive indication of continued heavy government intervention. The coef- 
ficient on the dollar and the R2  term suggest that the link to the dollar was as 
strong during the period 1991 to May  1992 as in the preceding two to four 
years. 
12.6  Concluding Remarks 
This paper reaches several conclusions. (1) The U.S. dollar continues to be 
the dominant international currency in East Asian exchange rate policies. All 
nine East Asian countries have assigned heavy weight to the dollar, and many 
of them to the dollar alone. (2) Some currencies increased their weight on the 
yen during the mid-1980s. This may have been associated with the overvalu- 
ation of the dollar, instead of a genuine and steady increase in the role of the 
yen. Only two or three currencies actually showed a sign of increased yen 
weight at the end of the sample. Overall, the evidence does not suggest a sub- 
stantial trend of an increased role for the yen in East Asian exchange rate pol- 
icies. 
(3) The level of trade in East Asia, like trade within the European Cornmu- 
nity and within the Western Hemisphere, is biased toward intraregional trade, 
to a greater extent that can be explained by distance, GNPs, and other gravity 
variables. However, (4) there is no evidence of any trend increase in the intra- 
Asian trade bias, (5) the intra-Asia trade bias is not centered on Japan, (6) the 
strongest “bloc” of  any is the trans-Pacific one (APEC), including the United 
States and Canada along with the East Asian countries, and (7) the East Asian 
bloc effect diminishes when we include terms for APEC and for the general 
openness of Asian countries. 
(8) Adding bilateral real exchange rate variability to the equation explaining 
bilateral trade flows, we find a significant effect in  1980, decreasing subse- 
quently. Such cross-sectional evidence is an important addition to the time- 
series evidence on the effect of  exchange rate uncertainty on trade. An  im- 
portant caveat is that an attempt to correct for likely simultaneity bias elimi- 
nated any negative effect of exchange rate volatility on trade in 1990 (though 
some remains in 1980). (9) The effect of exchange rate variability is relatively 
small. Even in the European Community, which did in some sense become a 326  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin  Wei 
currency bloc in the 1980s, the stabilization of exchange rates explains only a 
small part of our estimated trade-bloc effects. 
Overall, the evidence with respect to both trade and currency links suggests 
little support for the formation of a yen bloc. On the contrary, East Asian coun- 
tries continue to be strongly linked to the United States. Why does the yen not 
play a larger role in East Asian exchange rate policies? The U.S. dollar remains 
the preferred invoicing currency in international trade and lending, even within 
Asia, presumably for reasons of scale economies and history. Perhaps the even 
smaller role for the yen  in exchange rate policies can be attributed to the 
same causes. 
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COIllKlent  Koichi Hamada 
In this paper questions are clearly stated, analysis thoroughly carried out, and 
interpretations articulately given. I have no strong arguments against most of 
the authors’ findings and conclusions. I differ only in the emphasis I would put 
on the findings and in the nuance of my interpretation. Let me summarize here 
the authors’ main statements and my reactions to them. 
“All nine East Asian countries have  assigned heavy weights to the dollar, 
even though some countries have assigned increasing weights to the yen  in 
recent years.” 
Koichi Hamada is professor of economics at Yale University and a research associate at the 
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There would be a gap in the logic if one concluded from this statement that 
East Asia should be in the dollar bloc. The missing link, a hidden assumption, 
is that each country was driven by a purely economic rationale in its exchange- 
rate policy. In practice, however, political considerations may have motivated 
the pegging policy. 
I would not carry this argument much further because I do not mean that 
putting more weight on the yen  would be more rational. Due to the public- 
good nature of an international currency, which is well described in this paper, 
it is natural that many countries put heavy weight on the currency that is domi- 
nantly used as the international medium of exchange. 
“Though the level of trade in East Asia is biased toward intraregional trade 
to a greater extent than can be explained by distance, GNPs, etc., there is no 
evidence of any increasing trend in intra-Asia trade, and the intra-Asia trade 
bias is not centered on Japan.” 
The absence of trend coincides with our findings (Goto and Hamada, chap. 
14 in this volume). But is the level not as important as the pace of changes in 
the discussion of a currency union? It was quite natural for European countries 
to increase the intraregional bias in recent years when they were moving to- 
ward economic integration. Is it not important to point out that the degree of 
interrelatedness in trade among Asian countries have been high in spite of the 
absence of such a movement toward economic integration? 
Geographical distance is important and the gravity model is a useful way to 
take account of geographical considerations. The authors seem to imply that 
the intraregional trade bias due to proximity is not grounds for the formation 
of a currency bloc. But if intraregional trade bias is strong because of the affin- 
ity of  locations, it will not preclude the desirability of  creating an integrated 
market within a region. If  Asian nations are trading much with each other 
because of the geographical affinity among them-indeed,  an understandable 
phenomenon-it  will not weaken the case for creating a unified currency area 
among them. 
There is one inaccurate statement in the paper: In section 12.5, the authors 
write, “at least until recently, the Japanese government was inclined to resist 
whatever tendency there was for the yen to become an international currency in 
competition with the dollar” (emphasis mine). Indeed, the Japanese monetary 
authorities retained until recently many regulations to protect domestic finan- 
cial institutions. They did not encourage sufficiently the rapid creation of  a 
full-fledged domestic short-term capital market. Those regulations and policies 
sometimes worked against the more extensive use of the yen as an international 
currency. They regulated, however, for the sake of protecting domestic finan- 
cial institutions. They did not have a consistent policy of resisting all tenden- 
cies toward the internationalization of  the yen. Even within the Ministry of 
Finance, as in other bureaus like the Ministry of International Trade and Indus- 
try (MITI), there was tension between the internationalists who advocated in- 331  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
ternationally oriented policy and the traditionalists who defended the policy of 
protecting domestic markets. The statement in this paper is much too strong. 
In summary, this paper presents coherent documentation of facts and quanti- 
tative tests. The conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt, however. 
Alternative interpretations are possible. As the authors convincingly argue, the 
statistics do not support the immediate need for a currency bloc centering on 
the yen. But neither do they preclude the desirability of  a currency area of 
Asian nations by  themselves, nor do they present grounds for creating one in 
Asia based on the dollar. 
Finally, I had difficulty identifying any advocates of “the three possible com- 
ponents of a yen bloc hypothesis” (emphasis mine). Presumably this straw man 
was created as well as shot down in Berkeley. 
Comment  Sung Hee Jwa 
The authors seem to have succeeded in dispelling a myth about the yen bloc 
so clearly and forcefully that one cannot quarrel with their conclusion in any 
seriously critical manner. 
Frankel and Wei’s main findings are: (1) compared with the dollar, the yen 
has had a relatively small role in exchange rate determination in the East Asian 
economies, and its role as an invoicing currency in trade and finance has not 
increased as rapidly as the share of Japanese trade within the region. Therefore, 
the concept of  the yen  bloc can not be substantiated. (2) there is no strong, 
convincing evidence that trade activities in the East Asian economies have 
been concentrated within the region and centered on Japan to a “supernatural” 
extent, beyond what can be explained by  “normal” economic forces, such as 
the growth of economies in the area and short distances between them, within 
the context of the standard gravity model. (3) there is no genuine incentive for 
East Asian economies to maintain the stability of their currencies vis-his  the 
yen except to the extent that Japan happens to be their major trading partner. 
(4) the authors observe that it is the United States rather than Japan that wants 
the yen to play a larger role in East Asia. I will address each of these issues in 
the order they were presented. 
The Role of the Yen 
The rise to dominance of an international currency is analogous to that of a 
common language in which increasing the number of people who use the lan- 
guage consequently increases its utility, thereby allowing the language to as- 
sume the dominant role as a common tongue and to inhibit any newcomers 
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from assuming its role. Therefore, if  the yen were to emerge as the dominant 
currency over the dollar, it would happen discretely-as  a regime change when 
the environment (including noneconomic aspects) ripens to support it-rather 
than as a gradual process. Where the proportion of yen usage in trade and 
finance passes a certain threshold and is large enough to exploit the inherent 
external effect, the yen, which now plays only a minor role, will begin to as- 
sume a disproportionately and accumulatively larger role as the dominant cur- 
rency. 
How high the threshold must be is a challenging question, to be resolved in 
future research, but one should not expect any noticeable increase in the role 
of the yen until the threshold is reached. Therefore, the authors’ findings about 
the lower than expected role of the yen in exchange rate determination and as 
an invoicing currency should not be a surprise or a disappointment. Rather, it 
seems that the Japanese share in  the world economy still falls short of  the 
threshold even if the authors believe it is very high and rising substantially. 
In this context, it may be interesting to compare the importance of the cur- 
rencies of  major economies as invoicing currencies relative to the shares of 
those economies in the world economy and see if the importance of the yen is 
disproportionately greater or less than other major currencies. 
A Normal versus a Supernatural Trading Bloc in East Asia 
Frankel and Wei were interested in and searched for noneconomic forces, 
such as historical, political, cultural, and linguistic ties, leading to a possible 
supernatural trading bloc in the East Asian economies but failed to find sup- 
porting evidence. However, to anyone who hopes for or worries about the eco- 
nomic effects of a trading bloc centered on Japan, it is the simple fact of the 
bloc actually being formed regardless of the events causing the bloc that is the 
concern. For this reason, it is also equally important to note that the authors 
have clearly and systematically shown the emergence of  a normal or natural 
trading bloc among the East Asian economies, as the Japanese and other econ- 
omies in the region have grown so rapidly in recent years. 
In addition, their finding that no “supernatural” forces play a role in promot- 
ing a trading bloc among the East Asian economies is not at all surprising, 
because it seems natural to think that the East Asian region shares relatively 
fewer common noneconomic factors than Europe or North America. But in 
spite of their argument that there was no evidence that Japan had established 
or come to dominate a trading bloc in Asia, implicitly, indirectly, or openly, 
one should not be ignorant of the fact that Japan is investing a lot to improve 
the level of  East Asian understanding of Japan, which may be conducive to 
forming a supernatural trading bloc in the future. 
Concerning Frankel and Wei’s  regression equation based on the gravity 
model, it would be interesting to investigate whether there are any mutually 
enhancing and cumulative effects among the GNP or GNP per capita variable 
and other variables by adding cross-product terms of those variables. 333  Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? East Asian Exchange Rate Policies 
Who Is Interested in a Larger Role for the Yen? 
While the authors argue that it is not Japan but the United States that is 
interested in a larger role for the yen, it seems that this question can not be 
readily or easily answered. As mentioned earlier, even if Japan is eager to form 
and lead a trading bloc, as well as a yen  bloc, and is taking action in this 
direction, the special Japan factor may not be visibly detected in Frankel and 
Wei’s  approach. This may be because their approach may only be applicable 
to continuous cases and not to the discrete case of a shift of the natural monop- 
olist from the dollar, the existing dominant international currency, to the yen, 
the new competitor. 